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Terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures can cause problems to a national stability and functioning. Food and water 
supply chains are some of the most important infrastructures, and it is the country’s (government’s) obligation to provide 
sufficient quantities of food and water to its population. Intentional food contamination can, among other motives, originate 
from an act of terrorism (with political or ideological motives) with the aim of causing fear (terror) among people. Food 
defence systems can help assess vulnerabilities, determine mitigation strategies for terrorist attack, estimate risks, and 
prevent a terrorist attack. Risk assessment and prevention also include control over the production and distribution of 
potential chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents or their related materials. When a terrorist attack 
occurs, rapid and organised response is essential in terms of determining the type of agent used, managing the diseased, 
ensuring the functioning of the food and water supply, and the recovery of the infrastructure system under attack. Food 
defence planning as part of a food counterterrorism strategy should include considerations regarding the global food 
market and the fact that ingredients are supplied from all over the world (vendor certificates). Preventing terrorist attacks 
on sources of food and water is a far better option than crisis management once an attack had already been committed, 
but governments should have a response to any scenario.
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The 21st century has brought new ways of warfare, as 
well as dangers to national stability. The stability of a 
country is closely related with the functioning and 
protection of its critical infrastructures. Instead of direct 
military conflict, attackers with ideological motives will 
often apply asymmetric war methods. The logical answer 
is action through homeland security and counter terrorist 
legislation. 
Terrorism is unpredictable, which is exactly why it is 
necessary to consider potential targets of terrorist activity 
known as critical system points (such as the food or water 
supply chain). Intentional contamination of the food or 
water supply chain is called food terrorism (1). It is an act 
of deliberate contamination or a threat of intentional 
contamination of food for human consumption by chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents for the 
purpose of causing injury or death to the civilian population 
and/or disturbing the social, economic or political stability 
of a nation (2, 3). Agroterrorism (an aspect of food 
terrorism) is a malicious attempt by one or more persons 
to cause damage or destroy agriculture, the food industry 
or supply chains (4). Agroterrorism is considered to be a 
subset of food terrorism because the target is primary 
production (crops production and animal and fish farming) 
(5) and it represents an asymmetric and non-traditional 
attack. CBRN agents for attacking agriculture, food, or 
water supply critical infrastructures pose a new challenge 
for police departments, security and intelligence agencies, 
as well as agencies dealing with food safety and public 
health.
If intentional contamination of food or water supply 
chain is not committed for ideological reasons but for other 
reasons, e.g. to destroy a competitor, it can be defined as 
food terror (the distinction from food terrorism is described 
later on). Each country must ensure the availability of 
sufficient quantities of food/water (food security) for the 
population as well as sufficient amounts of drinking water, 
especially in moments when a terrorist attack on the food/
water supply chain occurs. Negative impacts to political 
and social stability (risk of protest, rioting, conflicts, and 
democratic breakdown) could be caused by food insecurity 
(hunger as a result insufficiency of food and water) (6). 
Weapons of mass destruction in countries that signed 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Collection and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on its Destruction (CWC) (7) and the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction (BTWC) (8) should not be present in any 
national laboratory legally unless for scientific or medical 
purposes, as the Conventions stipulate. Countries should 
be cautious in controlling national borders or shipments 
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from countries that are not members of the Conventions. 
The government should have under control suspected 
terrorist groups and their activities in the region, or reach 
an agreement with countries in its vicinity on cooperation. 
The scope of this review is to present an update of 
intentional food contaminations with known CBRN agents 
for the period 1998-2018, describe the characteristics of the 
used agents and food crime legislation, explain basic 
elements that have to be considered when protecting food, 
as well as propose responses to attacks at national level.
LITERATURE SEARCH
Our literature search relied on studies of intentional 
food contamination and risk assessment of food supply 
chain reported in articles covered by the PubMed database 
(1998-2019), international governmental organisations and 
databases, national guidelines, and news reports when 
original reports were unavailable. To filter them, we used 
combinations of the following key words: bioterrorism, 
intentional food contamination, homeland security, CBRN 
agents, food defence. Furthermore, we limited this review 
to data published in English and Croatian.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Food is defined as any substance or product, whether 
processed, partially processed or unprocessed, intended to 
be or reasonably expected to be ingested by humans. The 
term “food” includes drink, chewing gum and any 
substance, including water, intentionally incorporated into 
food during its manufacturing, preparation or treatment 
[Article 2, EUR-LEX 178/2002 (9)].
Critical infrastructure legislation in various countries
The European Union (EU) and its Member States have 
for some time now been trying to define which national 
critical infrastructures are of the highest significance and 
define a way of managing them, analyse risks, evaluate 
system vulnerabilities, and make a security plan for each 
critical infrastructure [EC Directive 2008/114/ EC (10)]. 
The Republic of Croatia passed in 2013 the Critical 
Infrastructures Act (11) and in 2017 released a draft of the 
Act on Homeland Security (12). 
In 1989, the United Kingdom (UK) passed the Security 
Service Act defining the protection of national security, in 
particular against threats of espionage, terrorism or 
sabotage, from the activities of a foreign force, which could 
jeopardize parliamentary democracy (13), in 2000 the 
Terrorism Act (14), which provided the definition of 
terrorism, while the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 (15), adopted on November 19, 2001, allows the 
UK Government the right to fight terrorism, control 
immigration, freeze terrorists’ property, monitor and control 
weapons of mass destruction, increase safety related to 
toxins, pathogenic organisms, nuclear industry, and increase 
the authority of the police.
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 
(CPNI), founded in 2007 in the UK (16), defined 13 critical 
infrastructures important for national security, including 
chemicals, food, water, health, and transport. The National 
Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) and 
the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC) were also 
established (17). In 2014, the British Standard Institution 
defined malicious activities targeting the food and food 
supply chain in the Food and Drink Protection Guide. These 
categories are: economically motivated adulteration, 
malicious intentional food contamination, extortion, 
espionage, food counterfeiting, and cyber-crime (16).
The Homeland Security Act from 2002, also called the 
Critical Infrastructure Information Act, recognized the food 
sector as one of the 17 critical infrastructures in the US 
(18). The US government identified the food and agriculture 
sector as a critical infrastructure, as the destruction or 
disabling of this sector would have a negative impact on 
citizen safety, national economic security, and national 
health (19).  
In 2002, the US issued the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (20), in which 
they developed national preparedness and responses to a 
terrorist act that would endanger food/water. This law also 
includes improvements in public health, to centers for 
disease control and prevention (CDCPs), or national 
emergency health system. It has been developed as a 
countermeasure and response to bioterrorist attacks. This 
includes additional control of hazardous biological agents 
and toxins (Department of Health and Human Services, 
Department of Agriculture) and protection of food from 
counterfeiting and adulteration as well as defence of food 
supply/drug supply chain, controls and inspection of food 
facilities in the US, and food import facilities. In order to 
prepare the US public health system and primary healthcare 
providers to address various biological agents, the CDCP 
classified biological agents into three categories with regard 
to the level of risk they pose to national security: category 
A (high priority agents: Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium 
botulinum toxin, Yersinia pestis, Variola major, Francisella 
tularensis, filoviruses, and arenaviruses) includes organisms 
that are easily transmitted to the general population, have 
high mortality rates and significant impact on public health, 
might cause public panic and social disruption, and require 
special action for public health preparedness; category B 
(second highest priority agents: Brucella species, epsilon 
toxin of Clostridium perfringens, Salmonella species, 
Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella, Burkholderia mallei, 
Burkholderia pseudomallei, Chlamydia psittaci, Coxiella 
burnetii, ricin toxin from Ricinus communis, Staphylococcal 
enterotoxin B, Rickettsia prowazekii, alphaviruses, Vibrio 
cholerae, and Cryptosporidium parvum) includes those that 
are moderately easy to disseminate, result in moderate 
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morbidity rates and low mortality rates, and require specific 
enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capacity and enhanced 
disease surveillance; and category C (third highest priority 
agents: Nipah virus and hantavirus) includes emerging 
pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination 
in the future because of availability, ease of production and 
dissemination, and potential for high morbidity and 
mortality rates and major health impacts (21).
The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) (22) 
passed in 2010 gives the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) the power to create new standards and rules to 
prevent foodborne/waterborne diseases. The reasoning 
behind this decision was to keep track of the modernization 
and complexity of the food supply system, changes in the 
nature of the food industry, higher quantity of food present 
on the market, as well as new dangers in food that had not 
been known until then.
Food crime legislation
There are no specific laws or regulations for food crimes 
in the US, but there is a general criminal law that could be 
applied (23).
According to US criminal law (24), terrorism is defined 
in §2332 as a violent act dangerous to human life and it is 
a violation of the criminal law of the US or any of its states 
and it would be a criminal violation if committed within 
the jurisdiction of US. §2332 also describes the use of 
weapons for mass destruction against US as a serious 
offense inside and outside the country (Chapter 113B). The 
same law prohibits biological (Chapter 10) and chemical 
(Chapter 11B) weapons. Destruction of national defence 
materials, premises, or utilities including livestock, water, 
food, food stuff suitable for the use by the US or an 
associated nation is defined as sabotage (Chapter 105, 
§2151). 
The European Union does not have a single criminal 
law to describe food crimes or any kind of crime at all, but 
the Member States have their own criminal laws (23). 
In the Republic of Croatia, the Criminal Code (25) 
defines some terms that could be applied in practice. A 
criminal act involving an attack on a critical infrastructure 
(food/water) can be caused by the production or marketing 
of products harmful to human health (Article 188) by an 
unconscious inspection of meat for human consumption 
(Article 189), or by endangering people’s lives and property 
with generally dangerous actions or instruments (Article 
215), by an act of terrorism (Article 97), or destruction or 
damage to public devices (Article 216). The criminal code 
describes what constitutes criminal responsibility, an act 
that can be committed by an individual or a group who 
intentionally performs that act, and who was aware or 
should have been aware that he or she was committing a 
criminal offense (Article 23). Criminal offenses can be 
committed by acting or failing to act (Article 20). According 
to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, even an 
attempt to commit a criminal offense is punishable (Article 
34).
Food terror and food terrorism – differences
Terrorism by Croatian criminal law is defined as: 
“Whoever, with the aim of seriously intimidating the 
population, or forcing a State, or an international 
organization to act or not to act, or seriously violate or 
destroy the fundamental constitutional, political, economic 
or social structures of the State or an international 
organization, commits one of the acts (endanger the lives 
of people, the destruction of state infrastructure, public 
facilities, property, produce, possess or use the weapons, 
explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or 
research those weapons, releasing hazardous substances, 
causing fire, floods or explosions that endanger peoples life, 
obstruct the water supply, electricity or basic natural 
resources, possesses or uses radioactive substances, uses a 
radioactive material or uses instrument releasing the 
radioactivity or damages a nuclear facility), which could 
seriously damage the state, committed an act of terrorism” 
(25) (Figure 1). 
Food terrorism examples have rarely been described in 
the literature and they are usually unconfirmed (26-28), 
such as Salmonella in ridden eggs scheduled for sale on the 
Israeli market (machine for counterfeiting the egg stamps 
was discovered) which resulted in one possible death (26, 
27); Ebola virus injected by armed men in water pumps and 
wells in Liberia which resulted in 16 possible deaths (29); 
bleach added to food (Taliban terrorist claimed to kill five 
people in a NATO base in Afghanistan) (28).  
Food terror is a broader concept than food (agro) 
terrorism, because it describes a criminal act involving the 
food/water supply chain as an act of deliberate contamination 
of food/water for human consumption by a certain agent 
(biological, chemical, physical, radiological), but the motive 
is quite different than classical food terrorism, which 
encompasses ideological motives for causing the injury or 
death of a civilian population or the disturbance of social, 
economic or political stability. Food terror is an act 
motivated by revenge, or to frighten someone, to destroy 
competitor food manufacturers, to sabotage food products 
but not an entire country, or due to the mental instability of 
the perpetrator (Figure 1). An example are needles in 
strawberries placed by the individual for revenge, as was 
the case recently in Australia (30); ethylene glycol spiked 
in baby food in supermarkets in Germany in order to extort 
money (31); mixing pesticide into sweets sold in a shop in 
Pakistan after an argument (32); rat poison injected into tea 
drinking products in four supermarkets by a man ‘angry 
with the world’ (28); one of the largest intentional mass 
poisonings in the United States was caused by drinking 
coffee spiked with arsenic by the church parishioner who 
admitted the crime in a suicide note saying that he just 
wanted to give people a stomach ache (33); the death of 
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ex-KGB agent Litvinenko after ingesting radioactive 
polonium-210 in his tea (27); Shigella dysenteriae type 2 
(in 1996) found in pastries left in the lunchroom by a 
laboratory technician who had access to the Shigella 
cultures in the St. Paul Medical Center hospital in Dallas 
that resulted in 13 employees falling ill (26).
For law enforcement, the main key is to qualify the act 
that happened according to the criminal law and homeland 
security directives as well as codes describing terrorism. 
The police could, after the evaluation of the criminal act, 
set up a model for how to behave with a perpetrator or 
offender. All food crimes have the common denominator 
of an intentional act but with different motives for food 
fraud (fraudulent activity with economical gain) and for 
food crime (ideological motive, terrorism, attack on the 
state’s economy, sabotage, or food terror) (Figure 1). 
FOOD DEFENCE SYSTEMS IN THE FOOD 
SUPPLY CHAIN
The FDA published Food Safety Guidelines for food 
manufacturers, food processors and food carriers, food 
importers, food stores, hospitality and catering facilities, 
dairy industry and processors and carriers in the cosmetic 
industry (34).
Food Safety and Inspection Service at the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA FSIS) FOOD defence 
guidelines and tools
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) in the 
US provided food protection guidelines for all food 
manufacturers, importers, carriers and distributors. These 
documents are designed to help the food industry develop 
their own strategies of preventing deliberate food 
contamination. These tools include: Food Protection Guide 
for Slaughterhouses and Processing Plants (35), Food 
Defence Guides for Warehouses and Distribution Centres 
(36), Food Defence Guidelines for the Transportation and 
Distribution of Meat, Poultry, and Processed Egg Products 
(37), Food Defence Guide to Freshwater Fish (38), Food 
Protection Guide for the Transportation of Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs (39), and Food Protection Guide 
for Disposing of Deliberately Contaminated Food and 
Decontamination of Production Facility (40). 
The food supply chain is considered to be global, 
because the raw material or food ingredients could come 
from any corner of Earth (41) (Figure 2). 
The final food product is compiled from many 
ingredients and raw materials purchased on the global food 
market (Figure 2) and they could already be contaminated 
during any phase of food production, food processing, food 
transportation, food storage, food sale or food preparation 
in household or public restaurants (food supply chain) 
(Figure 3). To trust the supplier of the food ingredients or 
raw material, one has to implement the food defence 
systems into the production process within the quality 
management systems that comprise food defence systems 
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236Jurica K et al. Food defence systems as an answer to food terrorism Arh Hig Rada Toksikol 2019;70:232-255
in their norms [FSCC 22000 (42), BRC Food Standard 8 
(43), PAS 96 (44), IFS Food Version 6.1 (45), SQF Quality 
Code (35)]. All suppliers should possess food defence 
certificates for their food. Others in the food supply chain 
(food industry, transportation, retail) should implement food 
defence procedures and politics in their facilities as a 
guarantee for secure and safe products regarding intentional 
contamination.  
INTENTIONAL FOOD CONTAMINATION
Intentional food contamination can cause the spread of 
fear to the public and have serious consequences for public 
health or a national economy. The public can lose confidence 
in food safety or a government’s efficiency. The likelihood 
of a successful attack largely depends on the accessibility 
to the target and the availability of the contaminating agent.
Methods of intentional food contamination could be 
(46): 
1. External attack: raw materials used in food production 
can be contaminated at the point where they are grown, 
transported or processed. Raw food is more likely available 
than finished food products. Contaminated raw material 
enters the production and processing facility through normal 
distribution routes. 
2. Forceful entrance to a food production and processing 
facility: a person who intends to contaminate food enters 
forcefully into the food production facility. Food suspected 
to be contaminated may be removed (whole LOTs) if 
another activity related to a forceful entry has been excluded 
such as vandalism or theft.
3. Secret entry to a food processing facility: entering a 
food process facility secretly, fraudulently or as part of a 
visiting group (e.g. drive-through students or system 
consultants) to gain access to food at some stage of 
production.
4. Inside collaborator: an attacker who has committed 
intentional food contamination in the production facility 
has taken advantage of legitimate access to food that an 
employee has in the food production facility.
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) 
agents
Many potential CBRN agents can be found in 
surrounding food chains (primary production, food 
processing, food distribution, food preparation). Some are 
pesticides, fertilizers, additives, preservatives and 
household chemicals which could be improperly used or 
misused. Table 1 shows the main potential biological and 
chemical agents that can be used to intentionally 
contaminate food and water.
A biological agent can be any organism or toxin 
produced by a living organism capable of causing disease 
in humans, plants and animals (47). The desirable 
characteristics of biological agents are stability in extreme 
circumstances like food processing, heating or UV light, 
exponential multiplication in short time, and pathogenicity. 
Considerable technical knowledge and financial background 
are needed for such an attack.
A toxic chemical agent is any chemical that can cause 
death, temporary inability or permanent damage to humans 
and animals, regardless of where the chemical agent is 
produced, with its chemical action on the biological system 
(organism) (7). If the chemical agent is colourless, odourless 
or the same colour as the food, the vulnerability of the food 
supply chain step will be higher (48).
System vulnerability is more sensitive to chemical 
agents and toxins than to biological agents. The main reason 
is that during the food manufacturing process, several 
microbiological controls are performed, whereas there is 
much less control for chemical contaminants (48). Also, 
food processing which implies heat treatment or other kinds 
of sterilisation (ultraviolet light) remove most of the 
biological treats. One exception is anthrax that is rather 
persistent in spore form, regardless of processing (5).   
Radiological agents are radioactive elements that may 
appear in the form of a liquid or solid and should be taken 
Figure 2 World Food Program USA by Karl Deily (41)
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Table 1 The main potential biological and chemical agents that can be used to intentionally contaminate food and water (48, 68-70)
Microorganism / 
Biological agent Disease Toxicity Symptoms of poisoning
Bacillus anthracis Anthrax ID: 8,000-50,000 spores Abdominal pain, fever, vomiting, bloody diarrhoea, and shock
Bacillus cereus
1. Diarrheal type of 
illness 
2. Vomiting (emetic) 
type of illness
ID: 105-108 organisms
1. Watery diarrhoea, abdominal 
cramps, and pain 
2. Nausea and vomiting
Brucella sp. Brucellosis ID: 10-100 organisms Fever, sweating, malaise, aches, and pains
Burkholderia mallei Glanders ID: unknown
Inflammation of mucus membranes 
of the nose, cough, chest pain, fever, 
rigors
Burkholderia 
pseudomallei Melioidosis ID: unknown
Acute septicaemic condition with 
diarrhoea
Clostridium perfringens
Several million C. 
perfringens per gram of 
food
Abdominal pain, diarrhoea, and 
possibly nausea
Campylobacter sp. Enterocolitis ID: <500 organisms Invasive diarrhoea
Coxiella burnetii Q fever ID: 10 spores 
Mild symptoms (chills, headaches, 
fever, chest pains, perspiration, loss 
of appetite)
Escherichia coli Enterocolitis ID: 106-108 organisms Gastrointestinal (diarrhoea, vomiting) dehydration;
Escherichia coli 
O157:H7 Enterocolitis ID<10 organisms Acute bloody diarrhoea
Francisella tularensis Tularemia ID: 108 organisms Influenza-like symptoms
Listeria monocytogenes Listeriosis ID: 107-109 CFU
Fever, muscle aches, nausea, 
diarrhoea, headache, stiff neck, 
confusion, loss of balance, 
convulsions
Salmonella sp. Salmonellosis ID: 104-105 organisms Vomiting and diarrhoea
Shygella dysenteriae Shigellosis ID: 10-100 organisms Diarrhoea, abdominal pain, and bloody stools 
Staphylococus aureus Enterocolitis ID: 105-108 CFU Nausea, vomiting, and abdominal cramping
Vibrio cholerae Cholera ID: 1,000 organisms Profuse watery diarrhoea, rapid dehydration, and a state of collapse
A and B 
Coxsackieviruses Bornholm disease ID: <3x10
3  organisms Fever, headache, and severe pain in the lower chest
Adenoviruses Enteritis ID: 5-104 organisms Diarrhoea, vomiting, headache, fever, and stomach cramps
Hepatitis A virus Hepatitis ID: 2-104 organisms
Fever, loss of appetite, diarrhoea, 
nausea, abdominal discomfort, dark-
coloured urine and jaundice
Rotavirus Gastroenteritis ID: < 100 virus particles Vomiting, abdominal distress, diarrhoea, and dehydration.
Toxin Origin Toxicity* Symptoms of poisoning
Abrin
Seeds of Abrus 
precatorius (jequirity 
bean)
LD: 0.1-1µg/kg  
(no antidote)
Gastrointestinal haemorrhage 
(bloody diarrhoea) with organ 




Fatal at high levels within a 
short period (no antidote) 
LD50 (B1): 1 mg/kg
Jaundice, rapidly developing 
ascites (abdominal fluid), and portal 
hypertension
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Alpha amanitin Amanita phalloides (death cap mushroom) LD50: 0.1 mg/kg Liver and kidney failure
Alpha-toxin Clostridium perfringens LD50: 3 µg/kg (mouse, intravenous) (no antidote)
Necrotic enteritis, delirium, and 
coma
Anatoxin A Anabaena flos-aquae LD50: 5000 µg/kg (mouse) (no antidote)
Loss of coordination, paralysis, and 
respiratory arrest
Botulinum toxin Clostridium botulinum LD50 (oral): 1 µg 
Progressive paralysis from head to 
toe
Ciguatoxin, maitotoxin Gamberdiscus toxicus 
(dinoflagellate)
Ciguatoxin (LD50): 0.25 μg/
kg (mouse, intravenous) 
Maitotoxin (LD50): 
0.13 ug/kg (mouse, 
intraperitoneal)
Nausea, abdominal pain, vomiting, 
diarrhoea, reversal of hot and cold 









Diphtheria toxin Corynebacterium diphtheriae
LD50: 100 ng/kg 
(intramuscular)










Microcystin Cyanobacteria  Microcystis spp. ID: 1-10 mg Fever, convulsions, and headache
Nicotine Nicotiana tabacum (tobacco plant) LD: 60 mg
Excess oral secretions and 
sweating, vomiting, diarrhoea, 
abdominal cramping, confusion, and 
convulsions
Palytoxin Palythoa corals LD: 600 µg/kg (mouse) (no antidote)
chest pains, breathing difficulties, 
tachycardia, unstable blood pressure
Ricin Beans of castor plant Ricinus communis
LD50: 1 mg/kg (no 
antidote)
Gastrointestinal haemorrhage 
(bloody diarrhoea) with organ 
necrosis; death can occur in 36-72 h 
(no antidote) similar to abrin
Saxitoxin Marine dinoflagellate Protogonyaulax sp.
LD: 0.3-1.0 mg  
(no antidote)
Abdominal distress, diarrhoea, 
nausea, vomiting, vertigo, headache, 
rapid pulse, and numbness of 






LD50: 2 ng/kg (mouse, 
parenteral)
Abdominal pain, watery diarrhoea, 
haemorrhagic colitis
Staphylococcal 
enterotoxin B Staphylococcus aureus
ID: 20-25 µg (no 
antidote)
Severe gastrointestinal pain, 
projectile vomiting, and diarrhoea
T-2 toxin
Mycotoxin from 
Fusarium and some 
other genera of fungi
LD50: 1.6 mg/kg 
Light headache, nausea, vomiting, 
and diarrhoea
Tetrodotoxin Pufferfish (fugu) LD: 1-2 mg (no antidote)
Numbness of the lips, tongue, and 
fingers, anxiety, nausea, vomiting, 
and other symptoms, progressing 
with time to paralysis. Death, usually 
within 6 hr, is due to respiratory 
failure.
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Chemical agent Class Toxicity* Symptoms of poisoning
Arsenic Metalloid LD: 70-180 mg Vomiting, diarrhoea, dehydration, multisystem organ failure
Barium Metal LD50: 132 mg/kg (rat)
Vomiting, abdominal pain, and 
watery diarrhoea, hypokalaemia, 
paralysis
Chromium VI Metal LD: 4.1 mg/kg
Irritation, ulceration and non-
neoplastic lesions of the stomach and 
small intestine
Cyanide Salts (sodium or potassium) LD: 1.52 mg/kg
Headache, nausea/vomiting, 
cardiovascular collapse
Digoxin Cardiac glycoside LD: 10 mg Nausea, vomiting, hyperkalaemia, and dysrhythmias
Dioxin Industrial by-product LD50: 22 µg/kg (rat) Chloracne
Ethylene glycol Antifreeze agent LD: 1,400-1,600 mg/kg Vomiting, metabolic acidosis, renal failure
Fentanyl Opioid LD: 2 mg
Lethargy or coma, decreased 
respiratory rate, miosis, bradypnea, 
and possibly apnea
Lewisite Chemical warfare agent LD: 50mg/kg (rat)
burn of mouth and throat, severe 
stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, and 
bloody stools
LSD (lysergic acid 
diethylamide) Hallucinogen ED: 50 µg
Sweating, rapid heartbeat, tremor, 
blurred vision, distorted sense of 
time, visual hallucinations.
Mercury (Inorganic) Salt (mercuric chloride) LD: 10-42 mg Hg/kg
Cardiovascular collapse, acute renal 
failure, and severe gastrointestinal 
damage
Paraquat Herbicide LD: 35 mg/kg
Pain in the mouth and throat, nausea, 
vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhoea, 
heart, liver, and kidney failure 




Pesticide LD50: 2-5 mg/kg
Metabolic acidosis, hypotension, 
dysrhythmias, seizures, coma, and 
respiratory depression
Strychnine Rodenticide LD: 30-120 mg
Muscle spasms and cramps, stiffness 
and tightness, agitation, heightened 
awareness and responsiveness, and 
respiratory failure
Sulphur mustard Chemical warfare agent LD: 0.7 mg/kg Abdominal pain, diarrhoea, fever, nausea, and vomiting
Superwarfarin Rodenticide LD: 15 mg
Gingival bleeding, petechial 
haemorrhages, and intracranial 
haemorrhages
Tetramine Rodenticide LD: 7-10 mg Seizure and coma
White phosphorus Rodenticide TD: 15 mg LD: 50 mg 
Severe vomiting, diarrhoea, garlic-
like odour, dysrhythmias, coma, and 
hypotension
Thallium Rodenticide LD: 54-110 mg/kg Abdominal pain, painful ascending neuropathy, seizures, and hair loss
*Route of exposure: oral, otherwise stated. Note: lethal doses were expressed as stated in the cited literature. Whenever a dose is 
expressed in mg, µg, or ng, this refers to an adult person of 70 kg in weight. LD – lethal dose; LD50 – lethal dose for 50 % of test 
sample; ID – infectious dose; TD – toxic dose; ED – effective dose
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into account for the possibility of causing acute and chronic 
health effects. They could be of natural origin or industrial 
by-products and include any radiological substance (5). 
Nuclear agents are a subgroup of radiological agents 
and are not of natural origin and should be processed for 
use as a threat in intentional food contamination. Attacks 
with radionuclear agents are very uncommon due to the 
hard accessibility of raw materials (5).
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
monitors biological and chemical agents that could be used 
by terrorists, and these substances are difficult to obtain in 
large quantities. 
The expected consequences and effects of CBRN 
contaminations in the food chain include health casualties, 
economic losses, social and political disruption. 
CRITICAL POINTS FOR AGENT 
ENTRANCE INTO THE FOOD/WATER 
SUPPLY CHAIN
The magnitude of a food chain CBRN attack depends 
on the type and quantity of the CBRN agent used, its point 
of entry, human resistance to an agent and possibility of 
applying a proper medical treatment as well as the speed 
of discovery by national or local authorities.
Dangerous biological agents are deadly or very 
infectious, resistant to environmental factors, not easily 
destroyed, have a low infectious dose, transmitted by air, 
water and food, transmitted from man to man, cheap and 
easily produced (49).
It is very hard to make a distinction between terrorism 
and criminal activity because the nature of these agents is 
such that whatever the underlying motivation behind their 
use, biological, chemical and radiological agents have the 
potential to do significant harm, or create an atmosphere of 
fear and panic.
When predicting possible consequences and effects, 
one should be aware of the different factors resulting from 
diverse methods to produce, process, transport, store, and 
prepare food, as well as cultural and geographical 
differences. Thus, actual risks have to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis.
Food production – crops and animal farming
Cases involving intentional contamination at this point 
of the food supply chain could cause economic losses due 
to the deaths of numerous animals or the destructions of 
crops, but they would probably not result in any human 
fatalities due to the tests implemented before they can be 
sold on the market (27). Apart from direct losses of animals 
and crops which would have evident changes or symptoms 
in their organic systems visible to monitoring systems, there 
are also indirect losses due to compensation or protective 
trade embargos (50).
Food primary production includes plant production, 
animal farming and open raw water areas to be used for 
potable water production. This stage of the food chain is 
the most unprotected and vulnerable point of the food 
supply chain.
Attacks with CBRN agents in the plant production phase 
would probably be discovered fast because of noticeable 
changes in the affected plants (morphological changes, plant 
decay etc.). Therefore, incidents involving the intentional 
contamination of crops that ended up in the food supply 
chain are extremely rare. Only one incident was recorded 
in 2006 in Australia when a water tank used by a crop duster 
was contaminated with glyphosate, which caused visible 
changes in the crops. Despite noticeable changes, laboratory 
tests showed that the contamination level was not high 
enough to preclude one farm out of the three affected to 
place their crops on the market and later issue a recall. The 
incident resulted in a loss of one million Australian dollars 
(27). Crops can also be attacked, apart from chemicals, with 
crop diseases and crop-eating organisms that can cause 
large-scale damage (5). Because of the fast wide spreading 
of biological agents on large cultivated areas, crop diseases 
represent potential hazards for plants (Figure 3). Nowadays, 
food production facilities have better control through quality 
management and national monitoring systems so any 
change in the plant organism caused by an agent should be 
noticed and would probably result only in economic damage 
(5).
A deliberate attack with CBRN agents on livestock in 
farming should also be discovered quickly because of 
visible changes in animal organisms. One such incident was 
the poisoning of the water supply to a farm in Alabama 
(USA) with cyanide in 1970 that resulted in the death of 30 
cattle (27). Veterinary legislation suggests that a national 
body has jurisdiction over animal health protection and their 
welfare with constant surveillance (Ministry for Agriculture 
– Veterinary Department). So animal farming facilities if 
they are legal should have a permanent veterinary 
inspection. Definition of healthy and safe livestock as food 
for human consumption suggests that ill or dead livestock 
is forbidden for human consumption [EUR-LEX, 852/2004 
(51)]. Veterinary inspectors and veterinarians have an 
obligation to report if animals have infectious diseases and/
or major illnesses during farming (52). Livestock can be 
contaminated with biological agents either directly (e.g. by 
injecting different viruses) or indirectly by contamination 
of food ingested by animals (e.g. anthrax-infected food) 
(5). The most probable contamination of livestock (that 
could go into the food chain contaminated in the phase of 
farming) is with antibiotics and mycotoxins. A hazard for 
food supply system could occur if a competent authority 




Food processing includes milling, smoking, baking, 
air-drying, freeze-drying, blanching, jellying, freezing, 
fermentation, preserving in salt, sugar, alcohol or olive oil, 
pickling, and canning. All of the ingredients entering the 
food processing phase must have clear traceability 
(certificate standards) during admission (53). 
Processing will probably decrease the toxicity of the 
agent although an increase of toxicity cannot be excluded. 
If food processing facilities have food defence systems 
implemented (entrance control of visitors, couriers, external 
associates, part-time employees; security alarms and 
cameras; product not directly accessible during processing, 
etc.) the main problem for intentional food contamination 
could be an insider threat. This threat could be partially 
resolved by security checks of employees or by controlling 
critical points in each subunit of a food processing facility. 
Also, quality control procedures should be capable of 
detecting the contaminating agent (Figure 3). 
Food processing companies, during the combining of 
ingredients into the final product, should have a certificate 
for each ingredient that guarantees the ingredients are 
CBRN agent-free. Quality management systems regarding 
ingredients and final food products that offer solutions are 
FSSC 22000 (42), IFS ver.6 (45), BRC (43), recognised by 
GFSI (Global Food Safety Initiative) (54). Ensuring the 
safety of the final food products is imperative for all serious 
food-processing companies to prevent potentially unwanted 
global consequences (Figure 2). 
Food transportation 
Transportation is a phase in which food is transported 
from one place to another satisfying all food safety 
standards (traceability, temperature regime), practically 
from the food production phase as the initial one (farming, 
crop production, ingredients), food processing as the second 
and the distribution of final product to retailers as the third 
phase (Figure 3) (27). Contamination with CBRN agents 
is possible in all points of transportation. Control over 
transport firms, vehicles and their employees, with delivery 
announcement in advance (name of the employee, 
registration mark for the vehicle), or lock up the 
transportation storage part, and unlocking registration 
should offer more confidence in the safety of the product 
or ingredient. All products should have their original 
packaging without damage or misleading labels. 
Contamination in the transportation phase is more likely 
to occur if food is in liquid form rather than solid condition, 
packed in plastic rather than glass or exposed to air (such 
as bakery products), transported with simple or refrigerated 
trucks rather than in sealed liquid trucks (54).
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Food storage 
For the warehouse phase, vulnerability depends on the 
same factors as in the manufacturing and transportation 
phases: policies regarding visitors and employees, security 
measures, type of packaging as well as type of warehouses: 
non-refrigerated warehouses are more vulnerable to attacks 
(Figure 3). 
Food preparation 
Intentional food contamination occurs most frequently 
in the food preparation phase (before consumption) because 
of the vulnerability due to increased accessibility of 
unpacked raw food. In this phase, it is possible to cause 
intentional and accidental food contamination. Incidents at 
this phase have involved the heaviest casualties reported 
(27).
Contamination and poisonings of food with CBRN-
agents in this phase of the food chain is the least frequent 
food terroristic activity (but present nonetheless!), because 
it seems to be more personal and not directed at a larger 
population (no ideological or political motive). It is more 
of a food terror activity (criminal) with the motive to bring 
harm to someone because of personal feelings or to destroy 
the competition through sabotage. 
The addition of a CBRN agent into prepared food is 
completely under the control of the perpetrator. Due to the 
lack of further food processing in this phase, it is very likely 
that CBRN agents will retain their toxic potential, but there 
is no further distribution through the food chain system 
resulting in harm only to specific individuals (less than five 
or no casualties) (27). According to Dalziel (27), almost 
98 % cases of intentional contamination of the food supply 
chain occur at the consumer’s home or workplace and the 
most common agents used are household, agricultural, or 
industrial chemicals.
Human poisonings and poisoning attempts with known 
agents are presented in Table 2. Among the chemical agents 
used in food attacks, rat poison (anticoagulant) is the most 
frequently used, followed by cyanide-based products, 
pesticides, insecticides, arsenic, anti-freeze fluid and ricin.
The water supply chain 
The water supply system has three important 
requirements (sufficient amount of water, sufficiently high 
flow rates and pressure in the system, and needs to be safe 
to consumers) that maintain the specific functions of the 
water supply system. In the US, the water supply system 
has been deemed as incapable of being fully protected 
(lifting more fences, prevention of access, more locks, more 
security cameras, and more security guards) especially at 
the first point of the water supply system (large quantities 
of water – agent dilution). The elimination of biological 
pathogens from water for human consumption is carried 
out by ordinary water processing such as chlorination, 
ozonisation, ultraviolet radiation, ordinary filtration, which 
is the first line of defence (55). The spore form of anthrax 
(agent Bacillus anthracis) is probably of the greatest 
concern due to its persistency (5). Chemical agents have 
been used in water supply poisoning in a number of attacks 
and associated deaths or illnesses (28). Compared to food 
attacks, water attacks are much more likely to be linked to 
political motives and much less likely to be successful 
because of the large quantity of agent required (due to the 
dilution effect) and less specific planning. 
Water processing facilities (vulnerable point) should be 
more strongly controlled by physical control, video 
surveillance, and entrance as well as access control. Control 
of water during distribution through pipelines could be 
adequate at the levels of water flow and pressure control as 
well as control of measuring points or possible open parts 
of the system.
HOW TO PROTECT THE FOOD/WATER 
SUPPLY CHAIN?
The National Agricultural and Food Defence Strategy 
at state level must be carried out in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture as well 
as in coordination with Homeland Security. The strategy 
must include an implementation plan that will be used by 
responsible persons from the ministries, and be revised 
every four years by the heads of Homeland Security, 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture (56).
In order to protect food in a particular vital state system 
of food/water production or in any part of the supply chain, 
it is necessary to perform risk assessment following a certain 
order. 
First, the vulnerabilities of a system/supply chain 
(Vulnerability Assessment of Critical Control Points, 
VACCP) should be assessed, mitigation strategies should 
be adopted, and then the action plan should be designed as 
part of the mitigation strategy. When considering the type 
of threat, one needs to assess system vulnerabilities and 
potential threats or type of agents (Threat Assessment 
Critical Control Point, TACCP) that could harm the 
production/supply chain of food/water. Then the Food 
Defence Plan for production system/supply chain (Figure 
4) needs to be implemented (57).
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF 
CRITICAL CONTROL POINTS IN THE 
FOOD/WATER SUPPLY CHAIN (VACCP)
Vulnerability is a weakness in system design that can 
be used to deliberately contaminate food or the ease by 
which a contaminant can be introduced in sufficient 
quantities to achieve the purpose of the attacker after he or 
she gains access to a critical point of the food supply system. 
Identifying and defining weak points in the food/water 
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supply system in terms of potential deliberate food 
contamination that could harm the economy and public 
health is crucial when assessing the risk(s) and vulnerability 
of the system (58).
Since 2005, FDA has been using the CARVER+ Shock 
program to evaluate the vulnerability of the food supply 
chain system (58). Parameters are set up, then experts 
gather, food chain specificities are determined, points are 
assigned [conditions associated with lower attractiveness 
or vulnerability are assigned lower values (1 or 2), whereas 
conditions associated with the higher attractiveness of the 
target or higher vulnerability are assigned higher values (9 
or 10)], and estimations are ultimately obtained. CARVER 
is an acronym for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, 
Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability. 
Criticality: the food product can be more critical if the 
introduction of an agent at this point had a significant health 
or economic impact on the state. 
Accessibility: the food product is more available to an 
attacker when he or she can easily obtain a product to 
conduct the attack, contaminate the food product, and 
remain undiscovered. Accessibility implies the susceptibility 
of a target to a threat agent and is the measure of the 
probability of a successful introduction of an agent.
Recuperability is measured in the time required to 
recover a specific system (infrastructure, facility, or plant) 
in terms of new productivity. 
Vulnerability is a measure of simplicity by which a 
threatening agent can be introduced into a food product in 
sufficient quantities.
Effect is the percentage of productivity rate of an 
attacked food system on one facility/operation and is 
conversely related to the number of facilities that produce 
the same food product.
Recognizability is the degree to which an attacker can 
identify a target without replacement with other targets or 
system components.
Shock is a combined parameter of health, psychological 
and collateral national economic impacts of a successful 
attack on the targeted system (product, facility). The shock 
is considered to possess a national level of interest. The 
psychological impact of a successful attack on a food chain 
will be greater if there is a large number of deaths or the 
target of the attack has a historical, cultural, religious or 
other symbolic meaning to people (59). 
Action plan to reduce vulnerabilities
Any deficiencies noted during the development of a 
general mitigation strategy should be examined so as to 
evaluate all possible threats and costs to resolving the 
problem. It is critical that each subject determines what is 
appropriate for them and determine the weaknesses in their 
mitigation strategies.
Once the vulnerability is identified as important, an 
action plan is developed and has to offer the solutions 
included in the Food Defence Plan together with information 
on the activities to be carried out, control of the progress 
of these activities and the timeline for completing the action 
plan. The FDA has developed a computer program (FDP 
Builder) that helps owners develop their own personalized 
Food Protection Plan (57).
Figure 4 Food defence planning (57), adjusted
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Table 2 Human poisonings and attempts of poisoning with known agents 1998-2018
Country, date Source – Agent Motive Incident
Albania, 1998 Water Supply – tritol Political Five kilograms of tritol was thrown into the main waterline 
and cut off the water supply to 16 villages in Albania (26).
Israel, 1998 Eggs – Salmonella Political Counterfeit stamps on Salmonella-contaminated eggs caused two deaths (28).
Japan, 1998 Food – arsenic Unknown
Four people died and 64 were admitted to the hospital for mass 
food poisoning possibly involving arsenic contamination of 
curry at a summer festival in Wakayama (27).
Vietnam, 1998 Water and food – cyanide Financial gain
At least 13 death and unknown number of ill persons was the 
result of spiking water and food with cyanide. The couple 
who poisoned family and people to steal from was arrested 
and sentenced to death (28). 
Australia, 
1999
Tea – oleander 
extract Personal
A woman tried to poison her husband by putting oleander 
extract in his tea over two months in small doses (27).
China, 1999 Soup – nitric acid Business rivals
Aiming to damage the business of a competing restaurant, 
the owner hired four farmers to put nitric acid in a meat soup 
served in the restaurant that resulted with poisoning of 148 
persons (28).
China, 1999 Meat rolls – rat poison Business rivals
After eating meat rolls that had been laced with rat poison at 
a fast food restaurant in Deyang City, 48 people fell ill. Police 
suspected the owner of the competing restaurant (27).  
New Zealand, 
1999




A worker at a water treatment plant found a broken padlock 
and fertiliser poured into the water intake. The water supply 
for the entire town was cut off and analyses were immediately 
performed. Results showed a minimal concentration of the 
fertiliser with no risk for human health (27).
UK, 1999
Tea – copper 
sulphate Personal?
A 15-year old student tried to poison a teacher’s coffee by 
adding copper sulphate to it. The teacher noticed the taste and 
was not poisoned (27).
USA, 1999
Water – potassium 
cyanide Unknown
Seven students at a law school in Massachusetts were 
admitted to emergency unit after drinking water from a cooler 
contaminated with potassium cyanide (26).
Australia, 
2000 Tablets – strychnine Extortion
A man from Brisbane laced headache tablets with strychnine 
after sending extortion letters to the drug manufacturer. Four 
people were poisoned (26). 
Canada, 2000 Coffee – arsenic Unknown
Twenty-seven students got sick after drinking coffee from 
a vending machine at the university. Police found traces of 
arsenic in coffee machine (27).
China, 2000 Food and water – rat poison Personal
A man killed three neighbours and poisoned two with rat poison 
spiked in food and water. He was sentenced to death (27).
India, 2000 Food – pesticide Unknown Six workers died in Punjab after two of their colleagues had 
contaminated food with pesticide (26).
India, 2000 Liquor – cyanide Unknown Two persons died after consuming liquor contaminated with 
cyanide (26).
Italy, 2000 Wine – herbicide Personal A parish priest in Sicily was hospitalised after drinking wine that church sacristan spiked with herbicide (27).
Japan, 2000 Curry sauce – pesticide Extortion
The food company found that one of its curry sauce packets 
pesticide in a Hamamatsu supermarket was contaminated 
after receiving a threatening letter that the author would 
poison the company’s food products unless s/he was paid 50 
million yen (27). 
Singapore, 
2000




The water tank in a condominium block in Singapore had 
been deliberately poisoned with kerosene and turpentine (26).
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Country, date Source – Agent Motive Incident
Turkey, 2000 Water supply – insecticide Unknown
A news agency from Anatolia reported that a man was arrested 
for attempting to poison the water supply of the village of 
Kurusaray with insecticide (26).
USA, 2000 Coffee – rat poison Unknown Seven employees of a company were hospitalized after 
drinking coffee contaminated with rat poison (26).
USA, 2000
Food – domestic 
cleaners Personal
Three teenagers contaminated food with spit, urine, and 
household agents including oven cleaner and cleanser in a fast 
food restaurant in Rochester where they were employed (27).
USA, 2000 Salsa – rat poison Unknown
In Jacksonville, 34 students were poisoned after two seventh 
graders allegedly contaminated the school cafeteria’s salsa 
with rat poison (27). 
China, 2001 Noodles – rat poison Business rival
At least 120 persons in 16 restaurants were poisoned after 
eating noodles that had been contaminated with rat poison 
in Hunan Province. The incident was a deliberate attempt to 
sabotage the noodle factory (27). 
China, 2001 Soft drink – rat poison Personal
One person dies and 16 fell ill after drinking soft drinks 
spiked with rat poison. A man was practicing spiking poison 
at the supermarket before he poisoned his son and wife (27).
China, 2002 School meal – rat poison Personal
Ninety-two children at the primary school in Linxiang city 
fell sick after eating their school lunch contaminated with rat 
poison. Similar incident happened in the region of Xinjiang 
a year ago, when 100 primary students were admitted to 
hospital after eating a breakfast contaminated with rat poison 
that has been placed there by the teacher (27).
China, 2002 Pastry dough – rat poison (tetramine) Business rival
Up to 400 persons fell ill and 41 died by poisoning after 
eating breakfast in a fast food shop. A business competitor 
admitted to placing rat poison in the pastry dough (27).
China, 2002 Food – rat poison (tetramine) Personal
A restaurant employee poisoned food with rat poison to get 
revenge to boss who pay disputed. Five people died from 
poisoning (28).
China, 2002 Milk – rat poison (tetramine) Personal
A man killed his wife and poisoned 15 others by putting rat 
poison in milk (27).
Colombia, 
2002
Water supplies – 
chromium, sodium, 
nitrate, and pesticide 
(parathion)
Political
Authorities in Pitalito discovered that the local water supply 
was poisoned with chromium, sodium, and nitrate that had been 
delivered through one of the pipeline’s inlets. A month after the 
attack, authorities discovered a significant quantity of parathion 
in the water supply of Libornia. No causalties resulted from 
these incidents, which were attributed to the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (26).
Russia, 2002 Vodka –  potassium cyanide Political
The Russian Federal Security Service discovered a container of 
potassium cyanide solution near several bottles of vodka during a 
search of the village of Alkhan-Kala, Chechnya. Analysis of the 
bottles’ contents determined that the potassium cyanide solution 
had been mixed with the vodka Chechen rebels allegedly planned 
to sell poisoned vodka at markets in Grozny (26).
USA, 2002
Ground beaf – 
nicotine Personal
A supermarket employee poisoned 111 people by contaminating 
about 250 pounds of the store's ground beef with an insecticide 
which has high concentrations of nicotine (27).
Zimbabwe, 
2002 Tea – pesticide Religious 
Seven members of a religious sect died and another 47 fell 
ill after drinking tea poisoned by pesticide near the town of 
Nyazura. No arrests were made (28).
China, 2003 Soya & chilli sauce – rat poison Business
A man poisoned more than 60 people by putting rat poison in 
the soya & chilli sauce at breakfast buffet due to the business 
dispute (27).
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China, 2003
School breakfast 
– rat poison 
(tetramine)
Unknown
After eating breakfast contaminated with rat poison 
(tetramine), 161 students and staff at the Elementary School 
in Hunan Province were admitted to the hospital (27). 
China, 2003 Water tank –  pesticide (phorate) Business
Approximately 64 residents were poisoned when a man 
contaminated a water reservoir in Ruyang County with 
pesticide (phorate). He admitted to poisoning the water hoping 
that he will boost the selling of his water purifiers (26). 
China, 2003 Soup – rat poison (tetramine) Personal
Five people died after eating mutton soup spiked with rat 
poison. The man who poisoned the soup because of family 
dispute targeted wife and her relatives (27).
China, 2003 Food – rat poison Personal
The widow of a farmer in central China, motivated by revenge, 
poisoned 33 people by pouring rat poison into the food that 
was being served at the funeral. Ten people died (27). 
Italy, 2003




About fifty people in more than 20 cities had to be treated 
for a stomach pains after they drank bottled water spiked 




Food products – 
insecticide (folimat) Extortion
Four people were made ill as a result of the contamination of 
various food product with insecticide (folimat), One man was 
convicted for contamination aiming to extort money from 
food manufacturers (27).
Russia, 2003 Caviar and coffee – thallium Personal
A serial killer poisoned to death six people by putting 
thallium in coffee and caviar. He was curious if he could kill 
a man and leave no traces behind (28).
USA, 2003 Coffee – arsenic Personal
Sixteen people were poisoned and one man died from 
drinking coffee spiked with arsenic at a Lutheran Church. 
One of the church parishioners admitted to the crime in 
a suicide note that he just wanted to give some people a 
bellyache (33).
Indonesia, 
2004 Juice – arsenic Political
A human right activist was killed on the flight to Amsterdam 
when his juice was spiked with arsenic (27). 






A Ukrainian opposition leader was poisoned with dioxin in 
his food, probably soup (27).
USA, 2004 Baby food – ricin Unknown
Three incidents occurred in California when the notes on 
contamination of baby food with ricin were discovered in 
the jars. The authorities found trace amounts of ricin and no 
arrests have been made. Ricin was not in the purified form 
that can be deadly (27).
USA, 2004
Sports drink and 
food – ethylene 
glycol
Personal




Candy bars – rat 
poison Extortion
Mars and Snickers bars were contaminated with rat poison in 
an attempt to extort the money from the company. Nineteen 
people felt ill after eating candy bars (28). 
India, 2005 Liquor – potassium cyanide Personal
A woman killed her husband and his nephew by adding 
potassium cyanide in liquor they drank. The wife told the 
police that she was a victim of domestic violence (27).
Japan, 2005 Food – thallium Unknown
A 16 year-old Japanese girl allegedly contaminated her 
mother's food with doses of the rat poison containing 
thallium causing her to slip into a coma. Her motives were 
unclear (27).
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Taiwan, 2005 Drink – cyanide Extortion
Energy drink poisoner was sentenced to death after killing 
one person and injuring three others during an extortion 
attempt (27).
USA, 2005
Pudding and hot 
chocolate – rat 
poison
Personal
A man poisoned his three children to death by putting rat 
poison in their pudding and hot chocolate (27).
France, 2006 Mousse – insecticide Personal
A middle-aged man killed his parents by spiking chocolate 
mousse with insecticide after they refused to let him move in 





A woman has been arrested for allegedly lacing bottles of Coca-
Cola with herbicide in an attempt to extort the company (27).
UK, 2006 Tea – polonium-210 Political An ex-KGB agent died after radioactive polonium-210 was allegedly put in his tea (27).
USA, 2006




A man poured the dishwashing detergent into grape juice at 
a drugstore where he worked to get back at his bosses. More 
than 40 people got ill (28).
China, 2007 Noodles and milk – rat poison Unknown
One man died and eleven employees fell sick after eating 
noodles and soybean milk spiked with rat poison at the 
government department canteen (27).
China, 2007 Porridge – rat poison 
(fluoroacetamide)
Unknown
One person died and 203 people were poisoned after eating 
breakfast at a hospital restaurant. Investigators suspected the 
water used for cooking porridge was contaminated with rat 
poison fluoroacetamide. No further details were given by the 
authorities (27).
China, 2007 Water and food – thallium Personal
A student put thallium into the water and food of his three 
classmates who got sick (27).
USA, 2007
Ground beef – rat 
poison Personal
An employee was arrested and accused of putting rat poison 
in packages of ground beef at the supermarket as a revenge to 
her boss. The rat pellets were found before eaten (27).
China, 2008 Rice – rat poison Business rival
Three people died and nine were hospitalised after eating 
rice laced with a rat poison. Two men, who worked for rival 
business, were arrested (27).
Germany, 
2008
Gherkins – cleaning 
fluid
Extortion
A man poured cleaning fluid in the jar of gherkins in a 
supermarket demanding a six-figure sum of money. The 
contaminated  jar was found before causing any harm (28).
Iraq, 2008 Cake – thallium Political
Two children died and nine were poisoned with thallium in 
cake served in sports club. The source of the cake was bakery 






Disgruntled employee injected pesticide in frozen dumplings 
causing poisoning of 10 people (28).




Sewing needles were found in different foodstuffs 
(watermelons, bananas, cabbage, etc.) in various 
supermarkets. A woman was arrested for putting needles 
in fish sold by business rival but it is not clear if she was 
responsible for the other incidents (27).
Sweden, 2008 Food? – Shigella dysenteriae Political
One hundred and forty people was admitted to hospital after 
eating in the office's cafeteria, All suffered from the illness 
caused by the Shigella dysenteriae bacteria. Left-wing 
extremists claimed the responsibility for the outbreak (28).
UK, 2009
Curry – aconite ferox 
(Indian herb) Personal
A woman laced a pot of curry with aconite ferox and 
poisoned to death ex-boyfriend (28).
USA, 2009
Salsa – pesticide 
(methomyl) Personal
Disgruntled employees contaminated salsa in the restaurant 
with pesticide causing more than 40 customers got sick (28).
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China, 2010
Food – rat poisons  
(broamadiolone and 
chlrophacinone)
Extortion The extortionist spiked rice, fish, mushrooms, noodles with rat poison in the supermarket. No reports on ingestion (28).
China, 2011 Milk – nitrite Unknown
Suspect has been accused of poisoning milk from two 
dairies with nitrite which killed three children and 36 were 
hospitalised (28).
Israel, 2011 Food and drink – pesticide Political
Three Arab construction workers are accused of attempting to 
kill the six members of Jewish family by breaking into their 
home and poisoning their grapefruit juice, house tap water, 
and household food with pesticide (28).
Afghanistan, 
2012 Food – bleach Political
The militant group claimed to have killed five people in 
NATO military base by lacing their food with bleach. 
According to the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), bleach was discovered before it caused any 
harm (28)
China, 2013 Yoghurt – rat poison (tetramine) Business rival
Two children died after eating yoghurt injected with 
tetramine by rival kindergarten staff (28).
Japan, 2013
Snacks & frozen 
fast food – pesticide 
(malathion)
Personal
At least 2,843 got ill after eating Aqli Foods products that 
were poisoned with malathion by a disgruntled factory 
employee (28).
China, 2014 Snacks – rat poison (tetramine) Personal
Four children died and over 30 were poisoned with rat poison 




– rat poison 
(tetramethylene-
disulfotetramine)
Business rival A man who ran rival nursery made 76 children hospitalised and two dead after poisoning water with rat poison (28).
Liberia, 2014 Well water - Ebola virus Political?
At least 16 people are suspected to be dead because of well 
poisoning in Liberia. Armed men injected the virus into the 
water (29).
UK, 2014 Drinks – bleach Personal
Thirty-two workers and residents at care home for elderly 
were poisoned with bleach that was put in water and juice 
drinks by the malicious employee (28).
China, 2015 Tea – rat poison Personal
A man ‘angry with the world’ injected rat poison in tea 
drinking products in the four supermarkets. The incident 
resulted with one death and four hospitalisations (28).
Mozambique, 
2015
Beer – pesticide 
(malathion?)
Unknown
Nearly 200 people were hospitalized and 72 died after 
drinking traditional beer at a funeral. The man who poisoned 
beer with pesticide was arrested (28).
Pakistan, 2016
Sweets – pesticide 
(chlorfenapyr) Personal
At least 33 people died after eating laddu sweets laced 
with the insecticide chlorfenapyr. One of the shop owners 
confessed to mixing the pesticide into the sweets after an 
argument with his brother and co-owner (32). 
Germany, 
2018
Baby food – ethylene 
glycol (anti-freeze) Extortion
A man has been convicted of attempted murder after he 
poisoned jars of baby food in the supermarkets with ethylene 





Sewing needles were found in a number of strawberries sold 
by a supermarket. Disgruntled ex-employee believed to be 
behind the incident (30).
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THREAT ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL 
CONTROL POINTS (TACCP) IN THE FOOD/
WATER SUPPLY CHAIN 
TACCP is an integral part of crisis management of a 
company/facility/system or a national critical infrastructure. 
Company crisis management or company security 
management involves an expert for security and protection, 
fire protection, occupational safety, quality management 
system, food safety system, information security system. 
Most of the food industry is familiar with crisis management 
or risk management systems (ISO 31000: 2009) (60), and 
they already estimate risks through quality management 
and food safety systems (53).
Threats should be studied realistically, with scenarios 
in which it is possible to see what would happen or where 
the possible omissions are. Dangers stem from agents that 
can cause harm (biological, chemical, radiological, 
physical) or a person who is capable of inserting this agent 
into food/drinking water at specific critical positions of the 
food production system, facility or food transport. 
Supervision of persons entering a facility and coming close 
to food/water at any stage of processing or the employees 
of the company (contract staff, carriers) as well as agent 
supervision at the place of storage help to reduce the risk 
and threat of food contamination. The supply of ingredients 
and foodstuffs to be incorporated into the food product must 
be from reliable sources and they must have certain quality 
and safety certificates or come from facilities that have a 
developed food protection plan. Each transport to and from 
the facility must be arranged and controlled in such a way 
as to know which person transports the food or ingredients 
(announcement, security check). A particular risk is the 
globalization of the food supply chain, as the ingredients 
are often purchased all over the world and then incorporated 
into a single product (48).
In 2014, Croatia passed a crisis management plan 
regarding the food and feed safety which provides answers 
to potential crisis situations and “emergency situations”, 
ways of managing risks in such situations, and ways of 
coordinating national and local services (61). 
Prevention of attacks – mitigation strategies at critical 
points in the food supply chain
A mitigation strategy is a practice implemented to 
significantly reduce or eliminate weak points that were 
previously identified in the assessment of vulnerability and 
risk. It can be implemented throughout the entire process 
of food production, from agriculture, through processing 
to distribution and retail. 
Preventive actions and mitigation strategies in food/
water facilities comprise installing fences, control of entry 
to system areas that are critical points or have been deemed 
vulnerable in the vulnerability assessment, video 
surveillance on critical points, marking (badges) authorized 
employees in processing facilities, security check for the 
employees, and controlling visitor (badges) entrance, 
controlling vehicles for transportation that enter the facility. 
Agents that pose a threat for the food/water supply chain 
branch into four categories: physical agents such as glass, 
needles, metals, objects; biological agents are bacteria (e.g. 
Shiga toxin-producing (STEC) Escherichia coli O157:H7), 
viruses (e.g. adenoviruses and rotavirus), chemical agents 
(toxic metals such as lead, industrial chemicals such as 
ethylene glycol, toxins such as botulinum), and radioactive 
substances (e.g. polonium).
Mitigation strategies are the first and fundamental 
component of any food defence plan. 
Food defence plan
Food defence is defined as the protection of the national 
food supply chain from deliberate and targeted acts of 
intentional contamination and unauthorized penetration into 
the food chain (34).
There are three basic elements that have to be considered 
when protecting food, namely 1) prevention, 2) response 
to an event, and 3) system recovery. In terms of preventive 
activities, the management structure of the company or 
country should develop a strategy for the potential 
intentional food contamination accident like facility 
monitoring, withdrawal procedures for food product, 
investigation of suspicious activities and assessment of 
related programs.
Designing of a food/water defence plan is important for 
food management at national levels as well as the food 
industry level. It is necessary to be aware of all the potential 
weaknesses of the food/ water supply chain system, to know 
potential indicators or signs of deliberate contamination, 
but also any possible errors in the assessment. It is necessary 
to evaluate possible types of losses that can cause intentional 
contamination or long-term effects on the global supply 
chain. This is possible if a food defence plan for the 
prevention of intentional contamination of the supply chain 
is designed (62).
NATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT
National response to food terrorist attacks 
Nobody can prepare for a food/water terrorist attack, 
but a country should have tools and activities prepared that 
could be applied in the right moment. If the mitigation 
strategy was not helpful, and an attack to food/water critical 
infrastructure did occur, the country has to react. 
National preparedness for food terrorism emergencies 
should comprise food defence systems implemented into 
the food supply chain through vulnerability assessment, 
mitigation strategies, action plans and food defence plans. 
Ministries for health and agriculture in cooperation with 
departments for homeland security as well as public health 
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and scientific institutions should provide a framework for 
the implementation of food defence systems (Figure 5). 
The national strategy for food protection should be in 
harmony with the national system for emergency 
management, national response framework, national plan 
for the infrastructure protection, and national preparedness 
goals (56). The strategy prescribes the procedures for the 
ministries of agriculture and health regarding preparedness 
(agriculture and food sector), detection of incident, 
emergency response, system recovery. The ministries of 
agriculture and health are the leading departments in terms 
of food terrorism emergency and all state agencies, or 
departments, or scientific institutes should provide support 
to them. The police department should have knowledge 
regarding food emergencies and food safety. Local hospitals 
should adjust and train for such crises. 
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A national food emergency response (food emergency 
response team) should be designed in terms of who will 
react first (security agencies, institutes, ministries), who 
will quickly determine the type of CBRN agent used, 
(institutes and laboratories), how to control damage, how 
to cure victims, how to recover the system, and how to 
dispose of hazardous waste (Figure 5 and 6). 
A food emergency response plan (FERP) is part of the 
national emergency response plan, and all agencies involved 
should have annual training for their staff. The team is made 
of state health and agriculture staff, as emergencies could 
involve larger numbers of casualties (63). 
During the incident detection and response phase, it is 
assessed whether the incident was intentional or 
unintentional. Figure 6 shows the steps taken during this 
first phase. Once intentional food contamination is 
discovered or suspected, the appropriate government 
institutions (local police, state health authorities, state 
agriculture authorities) should be notified.
After intentional food/water contaminations, the 
command centre and food emergency response team should 
conduct an investigation with police and security agencies. 
Food products should be detained and withdrawn, with 
urgent agent detection (Figure 6).
The national emergency response team should be 
organised and equipped (laboratory equipment for rapid 
agent detection, highly trained personal) so it could 
investigate outbreaks in animals, plants and humans (56) 
as well as tracking of biological threats. 
The identification of an agent should be conducted in 
cooperation with scientific and public health institutes and 
the spreading of the disease prevented (Figure 5, 6). 
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During a crisis, it is recommended to also consider the 
contaminated food waste disposal with regard to the agent 
type and their characteristics. 
Food emergency recovery 
System recovery means ensuring agricultural and food 
production after the food emergency crisis returns into the 
pre-emergency conditions. Collaboration with the private 
sector on the development of production recovery plans 
should be established to move forward rapidly with 
agriculture, food production and international trade. The 
national and private sector should perform exercises on 
food defence plans with a view to long-term recovery. 
Prompt removal and efficient disposal of contaminated 
agricultural or food products, infected plants and animals 
is recommended as well as decontamination and restoration 
of the food sector affected by the crisis (56).
Hazardous waste management   
Disposal and decontamination of such contaminated 
products cannot be carried out until the investigation is 
complete and its disposal ordered. The development of a 
disposal and decontamination plan can be initiated during 
the incident discovery and incident response phases.
The disposal of CBRN contaminated food product or 
water are carried out by special teams or units in 
coordination with the command centre based on the expert 
advice of competent agencies (e.g. environmental protection 
agency, food safety agency) (40). 
Firstly, if corrective measures can be provided 
(decontamination of the food product or food facility), that 
would be the first step. If this is not feasible, the second 
step is waste disposal. 
Waste should be put in disposal categories (I-IV), which 
suggests the manner of disposal. Food contaminated with 
CBRN agents is in the IV waste (hazardous waste) category. 
There are two different techniques: landfill disposal or 
combustion techniques (40). 
Landfill disposals have to be coated with an almost 
impermeable layer to prevent waste from migrating to the 
environment, and with a designed cover for surface 
infiltration protection. This kind of landfill should have a 
double liner; leachate collection and removal system; a leak 
detection system, and control water flow and runoff to 
prevent the migration of hazardous ingredients during at 
least 25 years of weather (64). For contaminated liquid 
foodstuffs or any secondary wastewater from the 
decontamination process, surface indoor pools or landfill 
may be appropriate. 
Combustion is also commonly used when managing 
hazardous waste. Combustion can permanently destroy 
certain toxic organic compounds contained in hazardous 
waste by breaking their chemical bonds and converting 
them into their constituent elements. This technique can 
also reduce the amount of waste that needs to be disposed 
of on land by converting solids and liquids to ash.
During combustion, organic waste is converted from 
solids and liquids into gases. These gases pass through 
flames, heat further, and eventually become so hot that their 
organic compounds break down into constituent atoms. 
These atoms combine with oxygen to form stable gases that 
are released into the atmosphere after passing through air 
pollution control devices (65).
Some hazardous waste can be characterized as medical 
waste (biological contaminant) and should be disposed as 
such. Medical waste incineration is most commonly used 
to dispose of this waste. The incineration of this waste 
decreases its volume and destroys the pathogens in the waste 
material (66). 
For incidents involving the contamination of foodstuffs 
with radioactive materials, the waste products would be 
considered low level radioactive waste or transuranic waste, 
depending on the radioisotope and the amount of radioactive 
material used. If the pollution consists of a hazardous 
chemical and a radioactive component, then the resulting 
waste is called mixed waste (e.g. low-level mixed 
radioactive waste). Low-level radioactive waste is usually 
removed by shallow burial in engineered landfills, as 
required by the Nuclear Energy Commission. Low-level 
radioactive waste is buried in licensed facilities several 
meters into the ground in shallow trenches near the surface, 
usually in the tanks in which they were delivered. This kind 
of waste can also be stored (transport containers) in landfills 
that are not easily accessible to allow the destruction of 
short-lived radioactive materials. Such landfills should be 
safeguarded (67).
CONCLUSIONS
The basic idea of homeland security is to protect and 
defend the national critical infrastructures as well as the 
food and water supply chain regarding the main food 
industry in all phases (land cultivation, livestock, processing 
and food production, transportation, storehouses and retail). 
A country should pass a national strategy on the defence of 
food and water supply chain, as well as instructions for the 
state agencies included in the response to possible acts of 
food terrorism or intentional contamination of food. The 
strategy should be recommended or obligatory for counties 
or bigger cities especially with major food/water industries 
or cities with main system critical points. All possible threats 
(chemicals, industry/departments that use chemicals, 
poisons,  pesticides,  industry/departments with 
microbiological material, industry/departments that use 
radioactive elements) should be secured and be put under 
the surveillance of local or national agencies. 
A good way of thinking is to secure at least one main 
food/water supply chain that would be reliable when an 
asymmetric attack on infrastructure occurs, because a 
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country should be able to continue to live and function 
despite a terrorist attack. National food/water systems are 
well secured only in situations where they have implemented 
functional food defence systems that are periodically 
evaluated and self-monitored. Food defence systems can 
be implemented in all food/water supply systems larger and 
smaller.  
Food defence systems should firstly define the critical 
points and evaluate the vulnerability of a food system’s or 
supply chain’s critical points. Secondly, mitigation 
strategies should be written in an action plan for all critical 
points. This action plan should be self-evaluated and 
monitored with verification by responsible persons. If action 
plans already exist, oversights should ensure that they be 
newly rewritten and improved. 
State agencies have to do everything in their power to 
prevent terrorist attacks on the food/water supply chain, but 
the state must be prepared for the moment when a terrorist 
attack occurs. Strategies for food terrorism should be written 
and well known throughout a national crisis management 
system. National crisis management and damage control 
are very important in the moment of food terrorist attack, 
because there are procedures about the response to crisis 
(scientific institutes and agencies, public health institutes, 
food and environmental agencies, police departments, 
intelligence agencies, ministries of defence, departments 
of homeland security). Responses to crises should answer 
questions about the agent used in food/water terrorist attack 
and about the perpetrators or offenders. 
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Sustavi zaštite hrane kao odgovor na potencijalni teroristički čin putem hrane
Potencijalni teroristički napad na kritične infrastrukture može prouzročiti problem za stabilnost i funkcioniranje države. 
Opskrbni lanci hranom i vodom važne su državne infrastrukture, stoga država ima obvezu osigurati dovoljne količine 
hrane i vode svom pučanstvu. Namjerno trovanje hrane kazneno je djelo koje nastaje terorističkim činom (politički i 
ideološki motivi) ili izazivanjem straha (terora) među ljudima. Sustavi zaštite hrane mogu pomoći pri procjeni ranjivosti, 
određivanju strategija ublažavanja terorističkoga napada te pri procjeni rizika i sprječavanju rizika od terorističkoga 
napada. U procjenu i sprječavanje rizika pripada i kontrola prometa i proizvodnje potencijalnih kemijskih, bioloških, 
radioloških i nuklearnih (KBRN) agensâ ili srodnih materijala u državi i izvan nje. Kada se teroristički napad dogodi, 
bitan je brz i organiziran odgovor države u smislu određivanja vrste korištenog agensa, zbrinjavanja oboljelih, nastavka 
funkcioniranja opskrbe hranom i vodom nakon napada te oporavka napadnutoga sustava. Planiranje zaštite hrane kao dio 
strategije za borbu protiv terorizma hranom odnosno agroterorizma treba uključiti razmatranje globalnoga lanca opskrbe 
sastojcima hrane koja se nabavlja diljem svijeta (proizvođački certifikati). Prevencija terorističkoga napada na hranu bolji 
je izbor nego upravljanje kriznim događajem (počinjeni napad), ali država bi trebala imati spreman odgovor na sve opcije.
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